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Abstract: 
The overvaluation hypothesis (Miller 1977) predicts that a) stocks are overvalued in the 
presence of short selling restrictions and that b) the overvaluation increases in the degree of 
divergence of opinion. We design an experiment that allows us to test these predictions in the 
laboratory. The results indicate that prices are higher with short selling constraints, but the 
overvaluation does not increase in the degree of divergence of opinion. We further find that 
trading volume is lower and bid-ask spreads are higher when short sale restrictions are 
imposed.  
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1  Introduction 
If traders in financial markets have different opinions about the value of an asset, the 
optimists will buy and the pessimists will sell. Short sale restrictions prevent traders not cur-
rently owning an asset from selling it and thus exclude pessimistic traders from the market. 
The marginal traders' assessments of the asset value will thus be above average. If the price 
reflects these optimistic assessments, the asset will be overvalued, and the overvaluation will 
increase in the degree of divergence of opinion. This is the overvaluation hypothesis, which 
was first put forward by Miller (1977). Although it is incompatible with a rational expectations 
equilibrium (Diamond and Verrecchia 1987), it has received much attention (and a fair amount 
of empirical support) in the literature. The first wave of empirical studies dates from the 1980s 
and early 1990s; however, interest in the issue has been reignited recently, partially motivated 
by the question of whether short selling constraints contributed to the internet bubble of the late 
nineties. A third, and still ongoing, wave of research has been motivated by the short selling 
ban on financial stocks imposed by the SEC in September 2008.  
The empirical results, summarized briefly in section 2, are inconclusive. A possible ex-
planation for the contradictory findings is the fact that empirical research into the issue is com-
plicated by a number of impediments. Most importantly, neither the value of a stock nor the 
degree to which it is short sale constrained is directly observable. The same applies to the de-
gree of divergence of opinion. Consequently, researchers have to rely on proxies for all va-
riables of interest. These proxies may be noisy or even biased, and they may be correlated with 
other stock characteristics that affect valuation. Therefore, a controlled laboratory experiment 
that stringently tests Miller’s hypothesis can help to shed more light on the issue. 
In spite of the apparent advantages of an experimental approach, we know of only four 
papers that vary the level of short selling constraints in the laboratory (King et al. 1993, Ackert 
et al. 2002, Haruvy and Noussair 2006, and Bhojraj et al. 2009). The designs of these experi-
ments differ from ours in a number of important ways. Most importantly, there is no uncertain-
ty  about  the  fundamental  value  of  the  asset  and,  consequently,  no  divergence  of  opinion. 
Therefore, none of these papers can be considered as a direct test of Miller's (1977) overvalua-
tion hypothesis.   
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Our paper contributes to the literature by providing the first complete experimental test 
of  the  overvaluation  hypothesis.  None  of  the  measurement  problems  alluded  to  above  are 
present in the laboratory. The experimenter controls the information structure and, consequent-
ly, the degree of divergence of opinion. Similarly, short sale constraints are imposed by the 
experimenter. As identical assets van be traded with and without constraints, it is feasible to 
directly  compare  the  market  values  of  the  assets,  rather  than  inferring  overvaluation  from 
proxy variables or subsequent returns. The results of our experiments provide only partial sup-
port for the overvaluation hypothesis. Prices in the experimental markets are higher when short 
selling is prohibited. However, the overvaluation does not depend on the degree of divergence 
of opinion. We further find that trading volume is lower and bid-ask spreads are higher when 
short sale constraints are imposed. This is consistent with recent empirical evidence from the 
2008 short selling ban (e.g. Beber and Pagano 2009, Boehmer et al. 2009).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief 
summary of the literature. We describe the experimental design and procedures in section 3 
and the hypotheses in section 4. Section 5 presents and discusses our results. In section 6, we 
summarize our results and offer concluding remarks.  
2  Literature 
As noted in the introduction, the overvaluation hypothesis was first put forward by Mil-
ler (1977). The basic intuition is simple: if traders have different opinions about the value of an 
asset, the optimists will buy and the pessimists will sell. However, short sale constraints pre-
vent those pessimists not currently owning the asset from selling it. Optimistic opinions will 
then be overrepresented in market prices. Consequently, short sale restrictions lead to overval-
uation that increases in the degree of divergence of opinion.  
The overvaluation hypothesis put forward by Miller (1977) is inconsistent with a ra-
tional expectations equilibrium.
4 Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) presented a rational expecta-
tions model in which short sale constraints do not lead to overvaluation but reduce the speed at 
                                                 
4  It is fair to note that Miller (1977) was well aware of the limitations of his model. He explicitly refers to the 
winner's curse problem and argues (p. 1158) that "many investors are still following naive procedures".   
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which new information, negative information in particular, is incorporated into prices. Similar 
results, though in a very different context, are derived in Hong and Stein (2003). Recent theo-
retical research has revived the overvaluation hypothesis. Duffie et al. (2002) derived a model 
in which short sale constraints together with divergence of opinion (modeled by assuming dif-
ferent priors about the payoff distribution) may lead to overvaluation. In the model by Johnson 
(2004), higher degrees of divergence of opinion lead to lower subsequent returns in a fully ra-
tional context. In Scheinkman and Wei (2003), overconfidence creates divergence of opinion 
and, in the presence of short sale constraints, may lead to overvaluation. A similar result is 
derived in Jiang (2005). Gallmeyer and Hollifield (2008) presented a model in which the impo-
sition of short sale constraints can either increase or decrease stock prices, depending on the 
optimistic investors' intertemporal elasticity of substitution.  
Researchers have used various approaches in order to empirically test the overvaluation 
hypothesis. The most common one is to consider a cross-section of stocks and to test whether 
stocks that are subject to short selling constraints are overvalued and whether overvaluation 
depends on the degree of divergence of opinion. This requires (a) the identification of stocks 
that are short sale constrained, (b) a measure of asset value to identify overvaluation and (c) a 
measure for the degree of divergence of opinion.
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Various measures have been employed to identify short sale constrained stocks. These include 
considering the short interest (Figlewski and Webb 1993, Asquith and Meulbroek 1996, De-
chow et al. 2001, Desai et al. 2002, Asquith et al. 2005, Boehme et al. 2006, Cohen et al. 
2005), institutional ownership (Asquith et al. 2005, Nagel 2005, Berkman et al. 2009), the 
availability of options on the stock (Figlewski and Webb 1993, Danielsen and Sorescu 2001, 
Mayhew and Mihov 2004, Boehme et al. 2006, Phillips 2011), the inclusion of a stock in the 
"threshold list" (Diether et al. 2005), the rebate rate (Jones and Lamont 2002, Reed 2007, Ofek 
et al. 2004, Boehme et al. 2006, Cohen et al. 2005) and failures to deliver (Autore et al. 2010b, 
Diether and Werner 2010). However, recent evidence on the amount of short selling (12.9% of 
NYSE volume in the period 2000 to 2004 as reported in Boehmer et al. 2008; 24% of NYSE 
                                                 
5  Some papers have used alternative approaches to test Miller's hypothesis. Dong and Michel (2008) found that 
IPO undervaluation is increasing in measures of the heterogeneity of investor beliefs. Greenwood (2009) reported 
that trading restrictions around stock splits in Japan result in overvaluation.   
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volume and even 31% of Nasdaq volume in 2005 as documented by Diether et al. 2009a) sug-
gests that short selling constraints are not very widespread in the U.S. stock market.  
Some  researchers  identify  overvalued  stocks  by  analyzing  valuation  ratios  (Dechow  et  al. 
2001, Desai et al. 2002, Jones and Lamont 2002), by considering adjustments to analysts' earn-
ings forecasts (Francis et al. 2005) or by considering firm age or earnings volatility (Berkman 
et al. 2009). The most widespread approach is to rely on subsequent returns to identify overva-
lued stocks. This approach is based on the implicit assumption that either short sale constraints 
are removed or the divergence of opinion is reduced (e.g., because new information is re-
leased), leading to a decrease in the level of overvaluation. Negative returns are thus taken as 
evidence of initial overvaluation.  
The most widely used proxy for the degree of divergence of opinion is the standard deviation 
of analyst forecasts (Diether et al. 2002, Boehme et al. 2006, Berkman et al. 2009), but the 
standard deviation of returns and the turnover ratio have also been employed (Berkman et al. 
2009, Boehme et al. 2006).  
In summary, none of the variables of interest can easily be measured. In addition, the two ex-
planatory variables - the degree to which a stock is short sale constrained and the degree of 
divergence of opinion - may not be independent. D'Avolio (2002) documented that a stock is 
more likely to be "on special" (i.e., to be expensive to sell short) when the degree of divergence 
of opinion is high.  
Given the measurement problems and the different approaches implemented to resolve them, it 
is not surprising that the results in the empirical literature are not unanimous. A majority of 
papers find results that are supportive of the overvaluation hypotheses (e.g., Figlewski and 
Webb 1993, Danielsen and Sorescu 2001, Dechow et al. 2001, Desai et al. 2002, Diether et al. 
2002, Jones and Lamont 2002, Gopalan 2003, Ofek et al. 2004, Boehme et al. 2006, Cohen et 
al. 2005, Nagel 2005, Berkman et al. 2009, Aitken et al. 1998, Chang and Yu 2007 and Berk-
man and Koch 2008). Aitken et al. (1998) made use of the fact that in Australia, short sales are 
transparent. Using intraday event study methodology, they found that prices almost instanta-
neously decrease after a short sale. Chang and Yu (2007) used data from Hong Kong, where 
only stocks that are included on a short sale list can be shorted. The list is revised from time to 
time. Additions to and deletions from the list are associated with abnormal returns, the sign of 
which is consistent with the overvaluation hypothesis. Berkman and Koch (2008) analyzed 
trading activity prior to earnings announcements. They found that trading in the wake of earn- 
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ings announcements is dominated by buyer-initiated trades and that there are price run-ups 
particularly for stocks characterized by low institutional ownership (which are difficult to sell 
short) and high degrees of divergence of opinion.  
Other papers support the overvaluation hypothesis only partially, e.g., when equally-
weighted portfolios are considered (Asquith et al. 2005). Diether et al. (2005) found that re-
turns of small stocks are negative after a period of increased short selling (which is consistent 
with the overvaluation hypothesis) but that returns after inclusion of small firms in the thre-
shold list are, if anything, negative. The latter result is inconsistent with the overvaluation hy-
pothesis because inclusion in the threshold list implies more binding short sale restrictions. 
Brent et al. (1990) reported that returns are not smaller in the month after an increase in short 
interest,  which is  also  inconsistent  with  the overvaluation  hypothesis.  Mayhew and Mihov 
(2004) presented evidence suggesting that the negative returns around option listings docu-
mented by others are not robust. They conclude by stating (p. 22) that "we now believe that 
there is no credible evidence from option markets that a marginal change in the cost of short 
selling can have an impact on prices." Boehmer et al. (2010) found that there is no asymmetry 
between the speeds at which positive and negative information are impounded into prices.
6 
This is inconsistent with the overvaluation hypothesis and leads the authors to conclude that 
"[o]ur results ... cast doubt on existing theories of the impact of short sale constraints."  
Kaplan et al. (2010) conducted an interesting field experiment. They worked with a 
large asset manager who randomly withheld some of the stocks in his portfolio from the len d-
ing market. This creates exogenous variation in short sale restrictions which, according to the 
overvaluation hypothesis, should affect prices. However, Kaplan et al. (2010) did not find evi-
dence of a significant impact on prices.  In a recent paper, Diether et al. (2009b) analyze d 
whether the suspension of the short sale price tests mandated by the SEC  (regulation SHO) 
affected stock returns. Because the price tests deter short selling, the overvaluation hypothesis 
predicts negative returns.  However, the evidence is inconsistent with that prediction.  In an 
analysis of the internet bubble Battalio and Schultz (20 06) found no evidence that short sale 
constraints affected the prices of Internet stocks. Finally, several papers test whether the short 
                                                 
6  Au et al. (2009) arrived at a similar conclusion. They find that idiosyncratic volatility (which affects both short 
and long positions) is a more important deterrent to short selling than short sale costs.   
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sale ban imposed by the SEC in September 2008 led to an increase in the prices of the stocks 
that were subjected to the ban, and Autore et al. (2010a), Boulton and Braga-Alves (2010), 
Gagnon and Witmer (2010) and Harris et al. (2009) found supporting evidence for an increase. 
However, obtaining clear results is difficult because the Troubled Assets Relief Program and 
other programs were announced on the same day. From an analysis of stocks that were later 
added to the ban list, Boehmer et al. (2009) concluded that "the ban may not have provided 
much of an artificial price boost."  
Conflicting findings are provided by Bris et al. (2007) and Charoenrook and Daouk 
(2005). Both compared stock return characteristics in countries with and without short sale 
restrictions. The papers conclude that allowing short sales increases the efficiency of price dis-
covery. Charoenrook and Daouk (2005) found that when countries start to allow short selling, 
aggregate stock returns increase. This is clearly inconsistent with the overvaluation hypothe-
sis.
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In summary, even though  a number of empirical papers find results supportive of the 
overvaluation hypothesis, it appears fair to conclude that the issue is not yet settled. The me a-
surement issues alluded to above suggest that an experimental a pproach is called for. We are 
aware of four papers that addressed the effect of short sale constraints on pricing in a laborato-
ry setting. Three of these papers (King et al. 1993, Ackert et al. 2002 and Haruvy and Noussair 
2006) build on the experiments of Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988). These authors found 
evidence of persistent and frequent price bubbles in experimental markets for a long-lived asset 
with short sale constraints in place. King et al. 1993, Ackert et al. 2002 and Haruvy and Nous-
sair 2006 tested whether lifting the short selling constraints reduced the frequency and / or the 
magnitude of the bubbles. The results were mixed. King et al. (1993) found that a relaxation of 
the short sale constraints did not have much impact on the occurrence of bubbles. Ackert et al. 
(2002), on the other hand, found prices closer to the fundamental value of the asset when  the 
short sale restrictions  were relaxed. Haruvy and Noussair (2006) used a more differentiated 
experimental design and found that removing short sale restrictions reduce d prices, but does 
not necessarily make them more efficient. In fact, when short sales  were allowed, prices may 
                                                 
7  Charoenrook and Daouk (2005) attributed their result to increased liquidity, which, in turn, lowers expected 
returns and thus leads to an increase in stock prices.   
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be significantly below the fundamental value. A common feature of these experiments is that 
traders received symmetric information about the asset value. There is thus no divergence of 
opinion.
8 Consequently, none of these papers can be considered a test of Miller's (1977) ove r-
valuation hypothesis because it states that the divergence of opinion is a necessary condition 
for overvaluation to occur.  
Bhojraj et al. (2009) ran a series of experiments in which they var ied margin require-
ments. This is similar to varying the degree of short sale constraints. The fundamental value of 
the asset in their experiments was fixed and known to all traders. Thus, there was again no un-
certainty (and, consequently, no divergence of opinion) about fund amentals. The price was a 
deterministic function of the excess demand. A robot (the "sentiment trader") bought assets in 
each period, thus putting upward pressure on  the prices. If there were no short selling con-
straints, the traders should drive down the price to the fundamental value. If restrictions were in 
place, the equilibrium price may be above the fundamental value. The results indicate that r e-
laxing margin requirements (and thereby short sale constraints) can even exacerbate overpric-
ing, which is at odds with the overvaluation hypothesis. The experiments of Bhojraj et al. 
(2009) were designed to address how margin requirements and, in particular, the risk of margin 
calls affect pricing efficiency. Given that a) there is no fundamental uncertainty and b) the 
presence of the sentiment trader drove equilibrium prices above fundamentals when short sell-
ing constraints are binding, their experiments were not (and from our reading, not intended to 
be) a direct test of the overvaluation hypothesis.  
3  Experimental Design and Procedures 
Our experimental design differs in a number of important ways from former experi-
ments. Most importantly, in  all previous experiments, subjects had symmetric information. 
Obviously, the degree of divergence of opinion cannot be varied in a symmetric information 
setting. Another important difference is that the experiments in three of the four previous stu-
                                                 
8  There may be differences of opinion due to strategic uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty with respect to the behaviour 
of other subjects. Strategic uncertainty is, however, not under the control of the experimenter.   
9 
dies
9 featured a long-lived asset with a fundamental value that declined through the course of 
the experiment. Endowments were not re -initialized. Consequently, a subject exhausting her 
short selling capacity in one period was unable to sell in the next period. In contrast, our expe-
riments consisted of stationary replications of a one-period economy. 
We conducted 18 experimental sessions in which a total of 180 subjects participated.
10 
Participants were recruited among economics students at the University of Bonn using the on-
line recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner 2004). Ten subjects were assigned to one cohort. Each 
cohort participated in one experimental session that consists of three distinct parts . To allow 
the subjects to get acquainted with the computerized trading system, the sessions start ed with 
three training periods that have been excluded from the analysis. Subsequently, there were 20 
trading periods. In 10 of these periods, short selling was prohibited, and in ten periods, it was 
allowed. We thus chose a within-subjects design, i.e., each cohort faces both the short selling 
condition and the no short  selling condition. To control for order e ffects, half of the cohorts 
encountered the short selling condition first, and the other half faced the no short selling condi-
tion first.  
Subjects received a 20 € show-up fee for participation. In addition, at the end of the ses-
sion, two periods (one period of the no short selling condition and one period of the short sell-
ing condition) were determined randomly. The profit of these periods were converted into Eu-
ros at a rate of 20 ECU
11 = 1 € and added to (or subtracted from) the show-up fee.  
                                                 
9  The exception is Bhojraj et al. 2009.  
10  Four sessions were conducted with experienced subjects.  We thus had 100 subjects who participated in one 
session and 40 subjects who participated in two sessions. Double -counting the latter group yields the number of 
180 participants.  
11  In the experiment, all prices are denoted in Experimental Currency Units (ECU).   
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Asset value and private signals 
Subjects in the experiments traded a risky asset against a numéraire (cash, denoted Ex-
perimental Currency Units, ECU). The value of the asset was a random variable denoted V . 
The value was high (H) or low (L) with equal probabilities. The realization was determined 
randomly at the beginning of each period but was only revealed after the end of the period. 
Draws in different periods were independent of each other.  
At the beginning of the period, each subject received a private signal s that provided in-
formation on the value of the asset. The signal was either h (indicating a high value) or l (indi-
cating a low value). The signal had precision p where p was the probability that the signal is 
correct, i.e.,  
    Prob Prob p h H l L   
The signal is uninformative if p = 0.5, it is informative but noisy if 0.5 < p < 1 and it is 
perfectly accurate if p = 1. The conditional expectation of the asset value was  
     
     
1
1
E V s h pH p L L p H L
E V s l pL p H H p H L
      
      
 
Divergence of opinion 
We wished to test the hypothesis that the overvaluation implied by the existence of 
short sale constraints increases in the degree of divergence of opinion among traders. We there-
fore varied the degree of divergence of opinion across (but not within) cohorts.  
Our measure for the degree of divergence of opinion was the cross-sectional variance of 
the conditional expected value of the asset. If the asset value was high (H), on average a frac- 
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tion p of the traders received the signal h and a fraction (1 - p) received the signal l. The mean 
of the conditional expectations was then  
       
  
1
21
E E V s V H p L p H L p H p H L
H p p H L
                 
   
 
The cross-sectional variance of the conditional expected value of the asset was then  
        
        
   
2
2
2 2
21
1 2 1
1 4 4 1
Var E V s V H p L p H L H p p H L
p H p H L H p p H L
p p p p H L
                 
               
    
 
The corresponding values for the case of a low asset value were  
       
  
1
21
E E V s V L p L p H L p H p H L
L p p H L
                 
   
 
and 
     
2 2 1 4 4 1 Var E V s V L p p p p H L         . 
Thus, irrespective of the realization of the asset value,
12 the cross-sectional variance of 
the conditional expectations of the asset value was proportional to    
2 1 4 4 1 p p p p      . 
Therefore, we used   to measure the degree of divergence of opinion.   is zero when p = 0.5, 
because in this case, the signals are uninformative and the conditional expectations of the asset 
value are equal to the unconditional expectation.   increases when the signal becomes infor-
mative.   approaches zero when the signal precision p goes to one. This is the case because 
                                                 
12  This is an implication of our assumption that the asset value is equally likely to be high or low.   
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the number of traders who receive a wrong signal goes to zero when p approaches 1. There 
exists a signal precision p that maximizes the degree of divergence of opinion. This maximum 
value is obtained for p equal to 0.85. Figure 1 graphs   as a function of p.  
 
Figure 1: Divergence measure   against the signal precision p 
Parameter choice 
We chose the following parameters: H was set equal to 200, and L was set equal to 100. 
To vary divergence of opinion, we chose two different signal precisions. In some sessions, p 
equaled 0.6, and in other sessions, p was equal to 0.8. The two treatments were characterized 
by very different degrees of divergence of opinion. Table 1 shows the expectation of the asset 
value conditional on the realization of the signal and its precision. It further presents the ex-
pected number of traders with correct and incorrect signals and the measure   for the degree of 
divergence of opinion.  
Insert Table 1 about here  
13 
Previous experimental studies featuring a long-lived asset (e.g., Smith et al. 1988, King 
et al. 1993, Ackert et al. 2002 and Haruvy and Noussair 2006) have documented that without a 
short selling possibility, overvaluation may arise even in the absence of asymmetric informa-
tion. It is not clear whether this result extends to our design because we analyzed static repeti-
tions of a one-period economy rather than a long-lived asset. Still, to test whether the same 
effect arose in our experiments, we conducted two sessions with symmetric information. In 
these sessions, subjects did not receive private signals. We used the results of these sessions as 
a benchmark to measure the impact of divergence of opinion.  
Endowments and short selling restrictions 
Subjects in each session were randomly and independently  subdivided into two en-
dowment groups at the beginning of each period. The different endowments created a rational 
motive for trade among subjects. Half of the subjects were endowed with four assets and 150 
ECU (denoted the share endowment group). The remaining subjects were endowed with one 
asset and 600 ECU (denoted the cash endowment group). The (unconditional) expected values 
of the endowments were equal. Subjects of both endowment groups had unlimited access to 
credit at a zero interest rate. Therefore, a situation where a subject would have liked to buy 
assets but was unable to do so could not arise.  
In the no short selling treatment, short sales were prohibited. The trading system re-
jected any offer that, if executed, would result in a short position. However, in the short selling  
14 
treatment, short sales were allowed without any limitations and costs (e.g., lending fees).
13 
Short positions  were  covered at the end of the trading period. For each share shorted, an 
amount equal to the true value of the asset was deducted from the subject's cash balance.  
At the end of each period, the terminal wealth of each subject was calculated by adding 
the end-of-period cash balance and the value of the share portfolio (the product of the number 
of shares and their fundamental value).  The profit was then calculated as the difference b e-
tween the end-of-period wealth and the value of the endowment.
14  
Market structure 
The market was a computerized continuous auction market with an open limit order 
book. We used the software zTree (Fischbacher 2007) to implement the trading system at the 
University of Bonn Experimental Economics Laboratory (BonnEconLab). 
Each trading period lasted 150 seconds. At the beginning of each trading period, the 
limit order book was empty. Traders could submit limit orders or accept standing limit orders 
submitted by others. Order execution was governed by price and time priority. Order size was 
restricted to one share. The minimum tick size was set to one ECU which amounts to 0.67% of 
the unconditional expected value of the asset. 
Trading  was  anonymous;  subject  identification  codes  were  thus  not  visible  on  the 
screen. There was full post-trade transparency, i.e., transaction prices (but not the identity of 
                                                 
13  This implies that shorting supply is infinite. Alternatively, we could allow short selling but restrict the amount 
of shares that can be shorted, or we could introduce short selling costs. Results in Cohen et al. (2007) suggest that 
it is shorting demand, rather than supply, that causes valuation effects. We therefore decided to (implicitly) vary 
the shorting demand by imposing different degrees of divergence of opinion, but to keep shorting supply constant.  
14  The share endowment was valued at the fundamental value of the shares. Thus, a subject who did not trade had 
a profit of zero irrespective of the realization of the asset value.   
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the traders) were visible to all traders. Subjects were not able to identify whether a trade they 
observed results in a short position.  
Implementation issues  
If the realizations of the signals were determined entirely randomly, we would face two 
(related) problems. First, because the number of traders with correct and incorrect signals was 
determined randomly and thus changes, the effective degree of divergence of opinion may dif-
fer from the value shown in Table 1 and change across periods. Second, it may happen (partic-
ularly in the p = 0.8 treatment) that no trader obtains a wrong signal. In that case, however, 
there would be no informational asymmetry (although subjects would not be aware of that 
fact).  
To avoid these problems, we chose a modified procedure by fixing the number of cor-
rect and incorrect signals at their expected values. In the p = 0.6 [0.8] treatments, always six 
[eight] traders received a correct signal and four [two] traders received an incorrect signal. Ad-
ditionally, symmetry across the two endowment groups was imposed. Thus, in both endow-
ment groups of the p = 0.6 [0.8] treatment, there were three [four] traders with a correct signal 
and two traders [one trader] with an incorrect signal.  
This procedure had the advantage that, from the point of view of the individual subject, 
signals were still determined randomly with known precision p = 0.6 [0.8], while at the same 
time, the value of   was held constant.  
It may be the case that, with experience, subjects learn to avoid overvaluation. In prin-
ciple, this issue can be addressed by comparing misvaluation across periods and by comparing 
the results of those treatments where the sequence of short selling and no short selling is re-
versed. However, the 20 periods of an individual experiment may have not been sufficient for  
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learning to occur. To account for this possibility, we additionally conducted four sessions with 
experienced subjects, i.e., subjects that had already participated in a previous experimental 
session.  
Table 2 summarizes the treatments and introduces the notation that will be used in the 
sequel. "E" denotes a session with experienced subjects.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
4  Hypotheses 
Binding short sale constraints prevent traders who are willing to sell from doing so and 
will thus lead to lower trading volume. We therefore expect lower trading volume when short 
sale restrictions are in place. Trading volume, in turn, is known to affect liquidity. We therefore 
also expect that liquidity is lower when short sale constraints are imposed. This hypothesis is 
supported by empirical evidence from the 2008 short sale ban. Both Beber and Pagano (2009) 
and Boehmer et al. (2009) found that the ban adversely affected liquidity. We measured liquid-
ity by the quoted and effective bid-ask spreads in the experimental markets. We thus state  
Hypothesis 1: Trading volume and liquidity 
H1a: Trading volume is lower under short sale constraints 
H1b: Bid-ask spreads are higher under short sale constraints 
In the benchmark treatment (AP0 and PA0), traders only received information about the 
unconditional expected value of the asset. We should thus expect prices to be equal to or (be-
cause of risk aversion) lower than 150. According to the overvaluation hypothesis, both short 
sale constraints and divergence of opinion are necessary conditions for overvaluation to occur.  
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As there is no divergence of opinion in the benchmark treatment, we do not expect short sale 
restrictions to affect valuation. We thus expect  
Hypothesis 2: The benchmark treatment 
H2a:  In the benchmark treatment, prices are  equal  to  or (because of  risk aversion) 
slightly lower than 150.  
H2b: In the benchmark treatment, there are no differences between the short-selling and 
the no short-selling conditions.  
In those treatments with informational asymmetries (PA60, AP60, PA80 and AP80), there is 
divergence of opinion. The overvaluation hypothesis thus predicts that prices will be higher 
when short selling is prohibited. This yields  
Hypothesis 3: Short selling 
H3: In the presence of asymmetric information, prices are higher when short selling is 
prohibited.  
The overvaluation hypothesis predicts that prices increase in the degree of divergence of opi-
nion. In the experiment, we vary the degree of divergence of opinion, yielding  
Hypothesis 4: Divergence of opinion  
H4: The overvaluation due to short sale constraints is more pronounced when the de-
gree of divergence of opinion is higher.  
As noted previously, the overvaluation hypothesis in its original form is inconsistent with a 
rational expectations equilibrium. A similar statement can be made for our experimental de-
sign. If all subjects behave rationally, there will be no overvaluation. Even if subjects are not 
fully rational, they may learn and thus achieve outcomes closer to a rational expectations equi- 
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librium in later periods. If learning occurs, we should also expect overvaluation to be less pro-
nounced in those sessions that use experienced subjects. This leads to 
Hypothesis 5: Learning 
H5a: The amount of overvaluation decreases in the course of the experiment.  
H5b: The amount of overvaluation is smaller in the sessions that use experienced sub-
jects.  
5  Results 
5.1  Trading Volume and Bid-Ask Spreads  
Before reporting the results of our hypothesis tests, we present descriptive statistics on 
trading activity in general and short selling activity in particular. Table 3 reports the total num-
ber of sales and the number of short sales. Two findings emerge. First, short sales account for a 
sizeable fraction of total trading activity. Aggregated over all treatments 31.3% of all sales are 
short sales.
15 Incidentally, this number is very similar to the 31% reported for  NASDAQ by 
Diether et al. (2009a). Second, both total trading volume and the number of short sales are con-
siderably higher in the treatments with divergence of opinion.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
We now turn to a test of hypotheses 1a and 1b.  Table 4 shows figures on trading vo-
lume. We report the mean and the median trading volume per period for the short selling and 
the no short selling conditions. Besides separate results for each treatment, the table also con-
                                                 
15  To no surprise, traders with low signals engaged in significantly more short selling than traders with high 
signals.   
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tains (in the last line) the results pooled over all treatments. These aggregate results clearly 
confirm Hypothesis 1a. Both the mean and the median trading volume were higher when short 
sales were allowed. The disaggregated data reveal a similar picture, although with exceptions. 
Trading volume was significantly higher when short sales were allowed in three out of six 
treatments. In the PA80 treatment, the mean was significantly higher whereas there was no 
significant difference in the median. In the remaining two treatments (PA0 and PA60), there 
was no significant difference in trading volume. In summary, the results indicate that trading 
volume tended to be higher when short selling was allowed.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
Table 5 shows the results on bid ask spreads. We used two spread measures, the mean 
quoted spread (Panel A) and the mean effective spread (Panel B). We also calculated percen-
tage spreads. The results were very similar and are therefore omitted. The results are broken 
down by the degree of divergence of opinion (benchmark, p = 0.6, p = 0.8) and by the order of 
treatments (P-A, A-P, pooled).  
Consider first the columns labeled "pooled". They show results aggregated over the two 
treatment orders P-A and A-P. Consistent with hypothesis 1b, the mean quoted spread was 
always higher when short sales were prohibited. The difference is significant in the benchmark 
treatment and in the p = 0.8 treatment. The results for the mean effective spread are weaker. 
We found a significant difference in the predicted direction only in the benchmark treatment. 
In the other two treatments (p = 0.6 and p = 0.8), we did not find significant differences.  
Considering the results for the two treatment orders (P-A and A-P) separately reveals a 
slightly more differentiated picture. When the treatment order is P-A (short sales prohibited in 
the first half of the experiment and allowed in the second half), both quoted and effective  
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spreads were always lower (and significantly so in 5 out of 6 cases) when short sales were al-
lowed. However, when the treatment order is A-P, we found that (quoted and effective) spreads 
were lower when short sales were prohibited, which is at odds with our hypothesis. However, 
there is an intuitive explanation for this finding. The figures in the columns labeled P-A and A-
P reveal that there appears to be a pronounced treatment order effect. Consider the first two 
numbers in the first line of Panel A (benchmark case, short sales allowed). When the short 
sales treatment was the first treatment (A-P), the average quoted spread is 17.62. When it was 
the second treatment (P-A), the average quoted spread is only 5.90. This pattern is found in 
five out of six cases (the exception being the no short sales treatment with high divergence of 
opinion). It thus appears that spreads generally declined in the course of the experiments.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
Against this background, it is more appropriate to compare the spreads across short sell-
ing conditions for the first and the second half of the experiments separately, i.e., to compare 
the spreads in the short sales treatment in the P-A condition (where the short sales treatment is 
the second treatment) to the spreads in the no short sales treatment in the A-P condition (where 
the no short sales treatment is the second treatment) and similarly the spreads in the short sales 
treatment in the A-P condition to those in the no short sales treatment in the P-A condition. The 
resulting t-statistics are shown in the last two columns of Table 5. Out of a total of twelve cases 
(two spread measures, three divergence-of-opinion treatments and two treatment order condi-
tions), spreads were significantly higher when short sales were prohibited in six cases. We 
therefore conclude that our results support the hypothesis that short sale constraints adversely 
affect liquidity as measured by quoted and effective spreads. This result is consistent with em-
pirical results in recent papers studying the 2008 short selling ban (Beber and Pagano 2009, 
Boehmer at al. 2009).   
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5.2  Price Level 
Hypotheses 2 - 5 make predictions about the asset prices in different treatment condi-
tions. A test of these hypotheses requires a summary statistic of the asset prices. We used three 
such measures. The first is simply the mean price for each period. This measure assigns equal 
weight to each transaction within a given period. As the prices early in a period are less infor-
mative, it may be preferable to use a weighting scheme that puts more weight on transactions 
occurring later in a period. We therefore used a digitally weighted average price as our second 
measure. It is defined as  
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where  j T  is the number of transactions in period j and  i p  is the price of transaction i in 
period  j.  If  there  are  five  transactions  in  a  period,  the  first  one  receives  weight 
  1 1 2 3 4 5 115      , the second receives weight  2 15 and so on. Our third measure was 
the mean of the bid-ask midpoints. The midpoint is not affected by the bid-ask spread and is 
therefore often considered to be a less noisy measure of asset value.  
Hypothesis 2 relates to the benchmark treatment and predicts that prices in the bench-
mark treatment will be equal to or smaller than 150 (the unconditional expected value of the 
asset) and that, because of the absence of divergence of opinion, prices will not be higher when 
short selling is prohibited. We tested this hypothesis by analyzing the three price measures  
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described above. We treated the observations from different periods as independent.
16 We pro-
vide aggregate results and separated results for the PA and the AP treatments because the se-
quence in which  the subjects faced the short selling and the no short  selling treatment may 
have had an impact on market outcomes. In the benchmark treatment, we do not have to diffe-
rentiate with respect to the realization of the asset value because subjects d id not receive in-
formation about the value and, consequently, could not condition their actions on the asset val-
ue.  
The results are shown in the first lines of the three panels of Table 6. Panel A shows the 
results for the equally weighted mean price, Panel B those based on the digitall y weighted 
mean and Panel C those based on the bid-ask midpoint. All three measures yielded very similar 
conclusions. The only noteworthy difference is the  observation that significance levels tended 
to be higher when the analysis is based on bid-ask midpoints. This corroborates our conjecture 
that the midpoint is a less noisy measure of asset value.  
All three measures clearly indicate that prices for the benchmark treatments  were sig-
nificantly below 150 as shown in the first line of Table 6. We therefore conclude that our expe-
rimental design does not produce the "bubbles" that provided the starting point of previous 
experiments on short sales (King et al. 1993, Ackert et al. 2002 and Haruvy and Noussair 
2006).  
Prices  in the benchmark treatments  were, however,  significantly higher when short 
sales were prohibited (133.33 compared to 127.95 with a t-statistic of 2.17, these figures are 
taken from Panel A). The disaggregated data show that this is mainly due to a large difference 
                                                 
16  This is a common practice. It should be noted, though, that data from different periods of the same session are 
not, strictly speaking, independent because the same subjects interact with each other and share a common history.   
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in the PA treatment (129.67 when short sales were prohibited and 120.03 when they were al-
lowed), whereas the difference in the AP treatment is insignificant. The other two measures of 
asset value yield identical conclusions. The results thus suggest that prices tend to be higher 
when short selling is prohibited even in the absence of divergence of opinion. This contradicts 
Hypothesis 2b.  
Insert Table 6 about here 
In the non-benchmark treatments, subjects received signals about the value of the asset. 
We should therefore expect prices to depend on the realization of the asset value process. Con-
sequently, the results in Table 6 are presented conditional on the asset value being low (100) or 
high (200). In almost all cases, prices were higher when short sales were prohibited. There are 
only two exceptions from this general pattern (in the AP60 treatment and in the PA80 treat-
ment, respectively, when the true asset value was high
17).  
Although the sign of the price difference generally conforms to our expectations , the 
significance of the results is modest. Only three  (Panels A and B) or  two (Panel C) out of 
twelve t-statistics indicate significance at the 5% level (one -sided test). Taken together, these 
results provide weak support for our Hypothesis 3. They also suggest that, in contrast to Hypo-
thesis 4, the impact of short selling restrictions on prices is not increasing in the degree of d i-
vergence of opinion. A more formal test of Hypothesis 4 will be presented later. 
Table 7 addresses the learning hypothesis. Because the three price measures yield very 
similar conclusions, we restrict the presentation to the equally weighted mean price. In Panel A 
of Table 7, we report separate results for the first  half (periods 1-5) and the second half (pe-
                                                 
17  In Panel C there is a third exception in the "all" column for p=0.8 and a high asset value.   
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riods 6-10) of each treatment condition. The results do not support the hypothesis that the im-
pact of short selling restrictions on prices decreases with experience. Both the number of cases 
in which the price level was higher in the presence of short sale constraints and the average 
price differences were similar in the first and in the second half of the experiments.  
Panel B of Table 7 compares the results from the sessions with inexperienced and expe-
rienced subjects. Again, there is not much evidence that the impact of short selling restrictions 
on prices decreases with experience. Experienced subjects produce less overvaluation in the P-
A treatments but appear to produce more overvaluation than inexperienced subjects in the A-P 
treatments. The results in Table 7 thus suggest that the (weak) support for the overvaluation 
hypothesis documented earlier is not attributable to inexperienced subjects.  
Insert Table 7 about here 
Thus far, we have solely compared prices obtained under different treatment conditions. 
To obtain a more complete picture of the relation between short sale constraints and asset valu-
ation, we augment these univariate statistics with a pooled regression analysis. The dependent 
variable is the (equally weighted) average price
18 in each of 20 periods
19 of the 18 sessions. 
The price is likely to depend on the treatment and on the realization of the asset value process. 
For example, when p  = 0.8,  subjects have more precise information   compared  to the case 
where p = 0.6. We should thus expect higher prices in the p = 0.8 treatments when the true val-
ue is high and lower prices when the true value is low. To capture these effects , we included 
dummy variables for each treatment (except AP0 which is the base case) and interaction terms, 
                                                 
18  Using the digitally weighted average price or the bid-ask midpoint instead yields similar conclusions.  
19  In period 14 of one session (PA60E), no transactions took place. The total number of observations in the r e-
gression is thus 359.    
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defined as the product of the treatment dummies and a dummy variable that equals one when 
the realized asset value is high. 
In addition to these control variables, we included a dummy variable that equals one 
when short selling is prohibited (model 1). The overvaluation hypothesis predicts a positive 
coefficient. In an additional model (model 2), we further added two terms that interact the no 
short sales dummy with two dummy variables taking on the value one when p = 0.6 and p = 
0.8, respectively. The coefficients on these interaction terms measure whether the overvalua-
tion is more pronounced when the degree of divergence of opinion increases. The overvalua-
tion hypothesis predicts positive coefficients for both dummies.  
Insert Table 8 about here 
The results are presented in Table 8. The adjusted R
2 for both models is 0.55. The con-
trol and treatment variables thus explain more than half of the variation in prices. Many of the 
treatment dummies and the interactions of the treatment dummies with the asset value dummy 
are significant, and most of the coefficients have the expected sign. Most importantly, prices 
are significantly higher when short sales are prohibited. The coefficient on the no short sales 
dummy is 5.06 (t-statistic 2.63) in model 1 and 4.90 (t-statistic 3.21) in model 2. Thus, a short 
sale ban results in a price increase of approximately 5 ECU. This corresponds to 3.3% of the 
unconditional expected value of the asset. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 3.  
The coefficients on the additional interaction terms in model 2 are far from being sig-
nificant. Thus, contrary to Hypothesis 4 (but consistent with our previous results), overvalua-
tion does not increase in the degree of divergence of opinion. We provide a tentative explana-
tion for this result in the following section.   
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5.3  Discussion 
Our results provide partial support for Miller's (1977) overvaluation hypothesis. We do 
find that asset prices are higher when short sale constraints are imposed. We do not find, how-
ever, that the overvaluation increases in the degree of divergence of opinion.  
The explanation we offer is rooted in the design of our experiments. We needed to en-
dow traders with different information about the value of the asset to create divergence of opi-
nion. At the same time, however, we had to (or at least wanted to) abide by the established 
principles of experiments in economics. One of these principles states that the experimenter 
should not lie to the experimental subjects. We therefore created a design in which subjects 
received noisy signals but were correctly informed about the precision of these signals. Each 
subject was thus aware of the quality of the information she received. As a consequence, in our 
experiments, the information held by the traders was fully consistent with the true processes 
determining the fundamental value of the asset and the private signals that the traders received.  
The situation in the field may be fundamentally different. The behavioral finance litera-
ture has produced considerable evidence that traders in real world securities markets often have 
biased expectations, are overconfident about the precision of their information and their in-
vestment abilities and are sometimes driven by "sentiment". Investors are obviously not fully 
aware of these behavioral biases. Consequently, the information traders have (or believe to 
have) is not necessarily consistent with the true process.  
Our finding that short sale constraints have an impact on asset prices even under the re-
strictive conditions that we imposed in our experiments is, in our opinion, a strong result. We 
conjecture that the consistency requirement we imposed is responsible for the absence of a 
relation between the degree of divergence of opinion and overvaluation. Creating experimental  
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designs that do not impose such a consistency requirement is a potential avenue for future re-
search. The design of such experiments should, however, be closely guided by empirical evi-
dence from the field. Otherwise the danger arises that the design becomes arbitrary and pro-
duces arbitrary results.  
6  Summary and conclusion 
The overvaluation hypothesis first put forward by Miller (1977) predicts that assets will 
be overvalued when (a) short sale constraints and (b) differences of opinion exist. Numerous 
empirical studies have been conducted to test the overvaluation hypothesis. The results of these 
studies have not been fully conclusive, partially due to measurement problems. Neither the 
degree to which a stock is short sale constrained nor the degree of divergence of opinion and 
the true value of a stock are directly observable.  
To avoid the measurement problems present in empirical studies, we used an experi-
mental approach. In a laboratory setting, we know the fundamental value of the asset, we con-
trol the information held by the subjects (and thereby the degree of divergence of opinion) and 
we can impose short sale constraints under ceteris-paribus conditions. We can thus examine the 
impact of short selling constraints on valuation. Our design further allows variation of the de-
gree of divergence of opinion across markets.  
The results are only partially supportive of the overvaluation hypothesis. We find evi-
dence of higher asset values in the presence of short sale constraints. We do not find, however, 
that overvaluation increases in the degree of divergence of opinion. We further document that 
trading volume is lower under short sale constraints. Finally, we find that short sale constraints 
have negative effects on liquidity. This result is consistent with recent empirical evidence from 
the 2008 short selling ban.   
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Table 1: Parameter choice 
The table shows the parameters used in the individual experimental treatments. It further shows the expected val-
ue of the asset conditional on the signal and the expected number of traders with a correct and an incorrect signal. 
The full information benchmark is the expected value of the asset conditional on all 10 signals and under the as-
sumption that the numbers of correct and incorrect signals are equal to their expected values. The last line shows 
the measure of divergence of opinion, θ.  
 
  p = 0 (benchmark)  p = 0.6  p = 0.8 
  asset value  asset value  asset value 
  high  low  high  low  high  low 
asset value  200  100  200  100  200  100 
cond. expectation of 
trader with signal h 
na  na  160  160  180  180 
expected number of 
traders with signal h 
na  na  6  4  8  2 
cond. expectation of 
trader with signal l 
na  na  140  140  120  120 
expected number of 
traders with signal l 
na  na  4  6  2  8 
full information bench-
mark 
150  150  169.23  130.77  199.98  100.02 
measure of divergence of 
opinion (θ) 
0  0.0096  0.0576 
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Table 2: Treatment summary 
The table describes the treatments and shows the number of sessions that were conducted with each treatment 
condition.  
 
  sequence of treatments 
Signal precision  short selling prohibited - short sell-
ing allowed (PA) 
short selling allowed - short selling 
prohibited (AP) 
no signals (benchmark case)  PA0 - session 1  AP0 session 10 
p = 0.6 
PA60 - sessions 2-4 
PA60E - session 5 
AP60 sessions 11-13 
AP60E - session 14 
p = 0.8 
PA80 - sessions 6-8 
PA80E - session 9 
AP80 sessions 15-17 
AP80E - session 18 
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Table 3: Short selling activity 
The table shows the number of short sales in periods without restrictions. Column 3 displays the absolute number 
of sales, column 4 the absolute number of short sales, and column 5 reports short sales as a percentage of total 
sales. Column 6 aggregates these shares for the benchmark treatment and the two divergence of opinion treat-
ments. 
 
Divergence 
of opinion 
Order of 
treatments 
#sales 
#short 
sales 
% short sales 
 
Benchmark 
P-A  214  82  38.32% 
31.39% 
A-P  95  15  15.79% 
p = 0.6 
P-A  507  148  29.19% 
20.61% 
A-P  814  128  15.72% 
p = 0.8 
P-A  481  181  37.63% 
42.32% 
A-P  858  378  44.05% 
total  2969  932  31.39%   
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Table 4: Trading volume 
The table shows the mean and the median trading volume per period for the different treatment conditions. Col-
umns 5 and 8 report the t-statistics and the z-statistics for a test of the null hypothesis of equal means and medians, 
respectively. The last line shows results pooled over all treatment conditions.  
 
 
Diver-
gence of 
opinion 
Order of 
treatments 
mean volume per period  median volume per period 
short sales 
allowed 
short sales 
prohibited 
t-statistic  short sales 
allowed 
short sales 
prohibited 
z-statistic 
 
Bench-
mark 
P-A  27.10  32.10  -0.96  26.50  29.00  0.99  
A-P  10.60  8.00  2.28
*  11.00  8.00  2.02
* 
p = 0.6 
P-A  13.67  12.07  0.84  13.50  9.00  1.57  
A-P  23.60  12.27  4.25 
**  18.50  11.60  3.89
** 
p = 0.8 
P-A  14.25  11.12  1.99
*   13.00  11.00  1.41 
A-P  23.42  9.42  4.20
**  15.50  8.00  3.94 
** 
pooled  18.70  12.20  5.25 
**  15.00  10.00  5.15 
** 
 
Note:
 ** denotes significance on a 1% level, and 
* denotes significance at the
 5% level. 
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Table 5: Liquidity 
The table shows average bid-ask spreads for the different treatment conditions. Panel A shows mean quoted 
spreads, Panel B shows mean effective spreads. The results are differentiated with respect to the degree of diver-
gence of opinion, the order of treatments (P-A and A-P) and the short selling condition (allowed and prohibited). 
Columns 9-11 show the t-statistics for the null hypothesis of equal means. The t-statistic in columns 7-11 relate to 
a comparison of the prices in columns 1 and 4 (2 and 5; 3 and 6, 1 and 6, and 2 and 5).  
 
Panel A: Mean Quoted Spreads 
Divergence 
of opinion 
short sales allowed  short sales prohibited  t-statistics 
P-A  A-P  pooled  P-A  A-P  pooled  P-A  A-P  pooled  1
st half  2
nd half 
Benchmark  5.90  17.62  11.76  47.21  11.67  29.44  8.81**  -3.79**  3.59**  6.37**  3.42** 
p = 0.6  25.24  41.09  33.07  37.10  32.40  34.75  5.48**  -1.62  0.56  -0.86  2.20* 
p = 0.8  23.58  33.69  28.64  36.11  38.47  37.29  3.28**  1.26  3.17**  0.74  3.49** 
 
Panel B: Mean Effective Spreads 
Divergence 
of opinion 
short sales allowed  short sales prohibited  t-statistics 
P-A  A-P  pooled  P-A  A-P  pooled  P-A  A-P  pooled  1
st half  2
nd half 
Benchmark  4.17  10.94  7.55  38.49  5.42  21.95  6.59**  -3.45**  3.07**  5.16**  1.11 
p = 0.6  15.20  36.62  26.05  25.42  23.59  24.51  4.39**  -2.56*  -0.51  -2.35*  2.85** 
p = 0.8  22.27  25.45  23.86  27.62  25.75  26.70  1.41  0.89  1.12  0.74  0.83 
 
Note:
 ** denotes significance at the 1% level, and 
* denotes significance at the
 5% level. 
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Table 6: Price Levels 
The table shows the mean price per period for the different treatment conditions. We report separate results for 
periods with low and high asset values, respectively (no such distinction is made in the benchmark treatment be-
cause there traders did not receive signals about the asset value). Columns 3-5 (6-8) report the prices for those 
periods where short sales were allowed (prohibited). We provide separate results for those sessions were the order 
of treatments was P-A and A-P, respectively, as well as aggregated results. Columns 9-11 show the t-statistics for 
the null hypothesis of equal means. The t-statistics in column 9 (10; 11) relate to a comparison of the prices in 
columns 3 and 6 (4 and 7; 5 and 8).  
 
Panel A: Mean price, equally weighted 
Diver-
gence of 
opinion 
Asset 
value 
short sales allowed  short sales prohibited  t-statistic 
P-A  A-P  all  P-A  A-P  all  P-A  A-P  all 
Benchmark  120.03  135.87  127.95  129.67  136.99  133.33  3.49
**  0.94  2.17
* 
p = 0.6 
100  144.10  138.73  141.42  158.64  147.96  152.34  2.82
**  2.22
*  3.27
** 
200  156.25  148.67  152.04  157.84  146.27  153.04  0.36  -0.36  0.29 
p = 0.8 
100  122.97  127.92  126.72  138.61  129.70  133.99  1.77  0.17  1.32 
200  186.60  169.06  176.94  182.20  175.00  178.75  -0.87  0.90  0.42 
 
Panel B: Mean price, digitally weighted 
Diver-
gence of 
opinion 
Asset 
value 
short sales allowed  short sales prohibited  t-statistic 
P-A  A-P  all  P-A  A-P  all  P-A  A-P  all 
Benchmark  119.83  136.17  128.00  129.68  136.95  133.32  3.29
**  0.64  2.05
* 
p = 0.6 
100  143.68  137.67  140.68  159.59  147.51  152.47  2.85
**  2.19
*  3.26
** 
200  146.93  150.49  148.71  157.49  147.47  153.33  1.21  -0.54  0.85 
p = 0.8 
100  120.37  126.53  122.95  137.51  129.21  133.12  1.77  0.25  1.44 
200  188.09  170.04  178.14  184.53  175.82  180.36  -0.70  0.85  0.50 
 
Panel C: Bid-ask midpoint 
Diver-
gence of 
opinion 
Asset 
value 
short sales allowed  short sales prohibited  t-statistic 
P-A  A-P  all  P-A  A-P  all  P-A  A-P  all 
Benchmark  119.86  135.26  127.56  133.17  136.43  134.80  7.03
**  0.90  3.41
** 
p = 0.6 
100  142.55  143.15  142.85  152.87  146.97  149.39  2.35
**  1.07  2.36
* 
200  154.38  149.22  151.80  154.92  149.49  152.67  0.14  0.06  0.30 
p = 0.8 
100  119.81  127.68  123.11  134.03  132.67  133.31  1.88  0.64  1.90 
200  180.21  166.35  172.57  172.09  170.03  171.11  -1.70  0.80  -0.43 
 
Note:
 ** denotes significance on a 1% level, and 
* denotes significance at the
 5% level.  
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Table 7: Learning 
Panel A shows average prices for the first half (periods 1-5) and the second half (periods 6-10) of the different 
treatment conditions. The results are differentiated with respect to the degree of divergence of opinion (p = 0.6 
and p = 0.8), the realization of the asset value process (with the exception of the benchmark case), the order of 
treatments (P-A and A-P) and the short selling condition (allowed and prohibited). Panel B compares the results 
from the sessions with inexperienced and experienced subjects. There are no results for the benchmark treatment 
because there was no session with the benchmark treatment and experienced subjects. The structure of Panel B is 
similar to Panel A.  
 
Panel A: First half versus second half 
 
Diver-
gence of 
opinion 
Asset 
value 
short sales allowed  short sales prohibited 
P-A  A-P  P-A  A-P 
1st  2nd  1st  2nd  1st  2nd  1st  2nd 
benchmark  124.88  115.19  137.12  134.63  129.85  129.50  136.87  137.12 
p = 0.6 
100  146.08  142.73  137.80  139.51  151.23  174.93  148.18  147.72 
200  154.92  158.15  145.14  157.72  158.68  157.33  142.25  149.84 
p = 0.8 
100  126.67  118.34  129.05  126.69  145.82  131.40  122.36  144.38 
200  186.64  186.57  157.50  179.81  182.65  181.75  172.64  176.34 
 
 
Panel B: Inexperienced versus experienced subjects  
 
Diver-
gence of 
opinion 
Asset 
value 
short sales allowed  short sales prohibited 
P-A  A-P  P-A  A-P 
inexp.  exp.  inexp.  exp.  inexp.  exp.  inexp.  exp. 
p = 0.6 
100  145.35  141.92  136.13  147.57  160.23  147.50  143.41  158.36 
200  156.33  155.00  143.36  160.30  159.75  154.01  143.45  159.41 
p = 0.8 
100  116.76  144.70  134.90  104.65  148.62  125.73  133.04  117.99 
200  188.35  181.94  173.46  156.52  182.32  181.35  178.13  166.63 
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Table 8: Regression results 
The table shows the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the equally-weighted mean price of 
each period. We include control variables for the different treatment conditions and interactions between these 
control variables and a dummy that is equal to 1 whenever the asset value is high (200). In model 1, we include a 
dummy variable that equals 1 when short selling is prohibited. In model 2, we further include interactions between 
the short selling dummy and dummy variables that equal 1 in those sessions where p = 0.6 and p = 0.8 (denoted 
div 60 and div 80), respectively. The number of observations is 359 (18 sessions, each with 20 periods; in one 
period no transaction took place). t-values are based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  coefficient  t-value  coefficient  t-value 
constant  134.47  (69.51)**  134.58  (72.16)** 
AP60  2.73  (1.04)  2.08  (0.72) 
AP80  -3.61  (0.57)  -3.12  (0.47) 
AP60E  16.43  (3.77)**  15.68  (3.28)** 
AP80E  -25.09  (7.35)**  -24.62  (5.87)** 
PA0  -9.33  (4.03)**  -9.35  (3.95)** 
PA60  15.78  (4.49)**  15.12  (4.00)** 
PA80  -7.23  (1.48)  -6.94  (1.28) 
PA60E  7.55  (1.65)  7.22  (1.54) 
PA80E  -5.07  (0.51)  -4.52  (0.42) 
Value200  -1.04  (0.63)  -1.09  (0.66) 
AP60*Value200  4.62  (1.25)  4.63  (1.26) 
AP80*Value200  43.46  (5.76)**  43.37  (5.75)** 
AP60E*Value200  8.20  (1.23)  8.48  (1.26) 
AP80E*Value200  50.51  (8.57)**  50.45  (8.52)** 
PA0*Value200  -5.21  (1.75)  -5.18  (1.72) 
PA60*Value200  6.29  (1.46)  6.34  (1.48) 
PA80*Value200  55.85  (10.20)**  56.08  (10.14)** 
PA60E*Value200  8.64  (1.23)  7.92  (1.14) 
PA80E*Value200  51.69  (3.72)**  51.43  (3.69)** 
no short sales  5.06  (2.63)**  4.90  (3.21)** 
no short sales*div60      1.27  (0.47) 
no short sales*div80      -0.86  (0.22) 
adj. R
2  0.55  0.55 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 
 CFS Working Paper Series: 
 
No.  Author(s)  Title 
2011/04  André Betzer 
Jasmin Gider 
Daniel Metzger 
Erik Theissen 
Strategic Trading and Trade Reporting 
by Corporate Insiders 
2011/03  Joachim Grammig 
Eric Theissen 
Is BEST Really Better? Internalization of 
Orders in an Open Limit Order Book 
2011/02  Jördis Hengelbrock 
Eric Theissen 
Christian Westheide 
Market Response to Investor Sentiment 
2011/01  Mathias Hoffmann 
Michael U. Krause 
Thomas Laubach 
Long-run Growth Expectations and "Global 
Imbalances" 
2010/26  Ester Faia  Credit Risk Transfers and the Macroeconomy 
2010/25  Ignazio Angeloni 
Ester Faia 
Roland Winkler 
Exit Strategies 
2010/24  Roman Kräussl 
Andre Lucas 
Arjen Siegmann 
Risk Aversion under Preference Uncertainty 
2010/23  Carmen Lee 
Roman Kräussl 
Andre Lucas 
Leo Paas 
Why Do Investors Sell Losers? How 
Adaptation to Losses Affects Future 
Capitulation Decisions 
2010/22  Steffen Juranek 
Uwe Walz 
Vertical Integration, Competition, and 
Financial Exchanges: Is there Grain in the 
Silo? 
2010/20  Mahmoud Botshekan 
Roman Kraeussl 
Andre Lucas 
Cash Flow and Discount Rate Risk in Up and 
Down Markets: What Is Actually Priced? 
 
Copies of working papers can be downloaded at http://www.ifk-cfs.de  